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1The Case for an International Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
 
Abstract 
 
The limitations of International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs) and national Truth & 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) suggest the need for a new type of transitional 
justice mechanism.  ICTs focus excessively on retributory justice, with an inflexible 
format that does not adapt to local circumstances.  TRCs are much more flexible and 
locally responsive but suffer from under-funding, corruption, and accusations of local 
political partisanship.  An International Truth and Reconciliation Commission (ITRC) 
would sponsor TRC formation and operations as well as post-commission activities.  Its 
mission would be to preserve TRCs local connections while providing them additional 
local independence, moral authority and financial support.  Specific ITRC functions will 
include negotiating TRC formation agreements with national governments; providing 
specialized staff to run administrative functions; and providing links with international 
donors.  A successful ITRC may challenge and weaken national governments and even 
established transitional justice institutions like the International Criminal Court.  But the 
limitations of the latter institutions and the promise of a more broad based and 
individually tailored approach to transitional justice that the ITRC represents makes this 
risk worth taking.   
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3I. Introduction and Context 
 
The central concerns of transitional justice are key issues for countries recovering 
from violent conflict.  Currently, two types of institutions—international criminal 
courts/tribunals (ICTs) and nationally constituted Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
(TRCs)1--are among the primary means of addressing these challenges.  But both ICTs 
and nationally sponsored TRCs are constrained in their effectiveness.  This paper 
proposes forming a new international organization—the International Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (ITRC)--that addresses the weaknesses of both existing types 
of transitional justice institution.   By providing international oversight for nationally 
sponsored TRCs, the ITRC would seek to maintain the flexible local focus of TRCs while 
increasing their local independence and moral authority and providing access to increased 
financial support. 
International criminal tribunals like the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR respectively) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) are among the most 
well known transitional justice institutions.  These organizations use retributive western 
courtroom models to respond to serious crimes committed by high-level perpetrators.  
They receive significant sponsorship from the international community and set 
precedents that go beyond specific traumas.  Partly because of this sponsorship, ICTs are 
able to project an aura of independence and moral authority.   But they are limited in the 
goals they can effectively advance, and their retributory model can sometimes harm 
 
1 TRC is used throughout this text as shorthand for organizations dealing with Truth and/or Reconciliation.  
Originally, most bodies in this traditions were Truth Commissions, with Reconciliation a recent (and 
positive) addition to the title and function. 
4societal reconciliation.  For example, courts often fail to give victims a full voice, 
encourage forgiveness or create impartial/accurate history.2
TRCs are more flexible than ICTs.  They are also more nationally focused.  As a 
consequence, TRCs can tailor their activities to the specifics of individual traumas.  The 
South African TRC, for example, had separate bodies dealing with human rights 
(reconciliation), victim compensation and amnesty.3 But this local connection also 
exposes nationally constituted TRCs to significant political pressures as well as 
(sometimes well supported) accusations of corruption—both of which can significantly 
reduce their effectiveness.  As a result TRCs are often less well supported financially by 
the international community than ICTs are.4
The ITRC should be an international body sponsoring the creation and operation 
of individual national TRCs.  It will also follow up after a national TRC concludes its 
activities.  From one angle, the ITRC deemphasizes one feature that accounts for the 
TRCs’ success—national focus.  But it will preserve other strengths—flexibility and 
proximity to individual cultures—while importing some of the benefits associated with 
international tribunals:  local independence, moral authority and better financial support.  
By focusing on less coercive activities than those conducted by the ICC, the ITRC may 
also entice broader participation by the United States in an international transitional 
justice institution.  It could also form specific partnerships with the ICC to advance the 
goals of both organizations. 
 
2 See, e.g., Hayner, supra note _ at 88-100. 
3 RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 21 (2001). 
4 Compare, Hayner, supra note _ at 223 and ICTR, GENERAL INFORMATION (2005), at 
http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (indicating that the annual budget of the ICTR was set at two hundred and 
thirty one million dollars). 
5An ITRC face predictable challenges.  Its formation would threaten the primacy 
of ICTs retribution-focused, courtroom model of justice.  Ideally, newly invigorated 
TRCs--better managed, more respected, better supported and addressing a broader range 
of transitional justice goals--would be an attractive alternative.  The ITRC would also 
take powers away from national governments that might otherwise be in charge of 
sponsoring national TRCs.  But the benefits that the ITRC could offer—which could 
include an increase in both quantity and quality of TRCs—are compelling enough to 
overcome these challenges. 
This paper is divided into four sections.  Section II discusses transitional justice in 
general as it is currently practiced today.  Section III forms of the core of the proposal.  
Section IV outlines the benefits the ITRC could yield, and addresses major challenges.  
Section V concludes with longer-term reflections on the challenges facing the ITRC. 
6II. Strengths and Challenges of Existing Transitional Justice Institutions 
 
A. Current Approaches to Transitional Justice 
 
Both international criminal tribunals and TRCs aim to achieve important 
transitional justice goals.  Leading theorists and institutions like Priscilla Hayner, Martha 
Minow and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has identified some of 
the most important.  One of these is to serve as a means of punishing crimes and 
achieving retribution on behalf of national societies and individual victims.  A second is 
to provide individual victims with voice, agency and compensation for their suffering.  A 
third is to provide an accurate record of what actually happened during a societal trauma.  
All these tasks can aid (and sometimes harm) the process of societal reconciliation—
which ideally prevents rights abuses from occurring again in future.  ICTs and national 
TRCs, while both effective at advancing different transitional justice goals, differ sharply 
in those that they emphasize.  Experts and communities differ in how they balance 
different transitional justice goals,5 and the most effective transitional justice efforts will 
establish a mix of policies and institutions specific to individual countries/areas.   
B. International Criminal Tribunals 
 
1.  Advantages 
ICTs are most effective at advancing punitive/retributory aspects of transitional 
justice.  Punishing those responsible for massive human rights violations is often very 
important to victims and their families.6 The severe penalties ICTs’ impose can 
theoretically establish norms of conduct that deter future crimes the world over.7 ICTs’ 
 
5 See, e.g., Hayner, supra note _, at 11-12, 154; Minow, supra note _, at 4-5. 
6 Minow at 135. 
7 See id.. at 49-51. 
7specific focus can also help channel retributory desires away from lower-ranking 
individuals towards official bodies and those persons with greatest command 
responsibility.  Assigning these entities blame for the actions of their subordinates can 
theoretically help with the reintegration of the latter back into society.8
Another advantage of ICTs is their relative independence and resulting efforts, 
real and ceremonial, to neutrally hear both sides’ arguments.  This approach can serve as 
an aspirational example to societies where this type of impartiality is rare.  More 
immediately, efforts to preserve the rights of defendants (by providing defense counsel 
etc.)9 can calm partisans’ senses that they are being wronged when particular political or 
military leaders are convicted.  By contrast, domestic political actors often easily hijack 
local proceedings—potentially alienating either supporters of defendants or their alleged 
victims.  In Indonesia for example, every single one of the 18 Indonesians charged with 
crimes relating to violence in East Timor were acquitted, to the outrage of human rights 
troops.10 
International Criminal Tribunals’ relative independence (and the foreign 
involvement that guarantees this) can also help them avoid the corruption and nepotism 
that dog many developing countries.  In Sierra Leone for example, the nationally 
sponsored TRC was harmed by constant, accurate rumors about corruption and loose 
accounting practices.  The Special Court, operating at the same time, did not suffer from 
this problem.11 While the ICTR’s well-documented problems demonstrate that 
 
8 See, e.g., id. at 26. 
9 Id. at 25. 
10 Indonesian Wins Appeal Against Rights Verdict, NY TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004 at A6. 
11 Compare PROMISES AND PITFALLS supra note_ and INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE’S
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION: A FRESH START? 5-8 (2002) [hereinafter A FRESH START?]. 
8international tribunals are not always free from corruption,12 international tribunals can 
use their prestige to protect themselves more effectively from nepotistic pressures and 
corruption.  In addition to making them more effective in an immediate sense, the 
relatively independent/honest reputation of ICTs helps them attract donor support.13 This 
can be parlayed into a self-supporting cycle of institutional improvement and additional 
donor support. 
 2.  The Western Courtroom Model’s Excessive Focus on Retribution 
Despite the strengths of their retributive model, ICTs also suffer from a number of 
problems that reduce their effectiveness as transitional justice tools.  The most glaring 
limitation of international tribunals is their exclusive use of retribution-focused 
courtroom adjudication.14 Reliance on courtrooms to address societal disputes has been 
criticized even in a domestic, developed country context, as ignoring means of alternative 
dispute resolution.  The latter are often seen as more flexible and ultimately more 
effective in dealing with a range of problems.15 While appropriate in certain cases, ICTs 
retributive model is often not sufficient.  
The problems posed by trial-type inflexibility are often magnified in the context 
of ICTs’ use of a courtroom model.  While trials’ overarching purpose may be theatre, 
 
12 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA: PRAGMATISME DE 
RIGEUR 13 (2003). 
13 In Sierra Leone for example, the TRC’s complex mission, as opposed to the familiar judicial model of 
the Special Court, made the latter much more effective at securing funding.  See A FRESH START, supra 
note _ at 9.  In addition, even sponsors who provided funds to the TRC were concerned about corruption 
and kept tight controls on these resources, limiting the TRC’s flexibility.  Id. at 8. 
14 See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, available at http://www.ictr.org/ 
ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html. 
15 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85 (2004); William K. Slate, II, ADR Methods Can Streamline Mass Tort 
Actions, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at D12.  
9scoring moral points or the like, their stated and immediate goal is to judge the accused.16 
On day-to-day level, ICTs aim to efficiently and fairly wade through the evidence against 
specific accused individuals rather than promote reconciliation, create a complete 
historical record, allow victims sufficient space to testify about the extent and impact of 
their injuries, or provide them with compensation.  While these may be potential positive 
side effects of certain trials, they are impossible to prioritize or guarantee in a forum 
whose very existence is premised on judging a specific defendant.17 
ICTs are limited in the scope of their activities by a historic trial structure that 
includes relatively inflexible safeguards and procedures.  But this inflexibility is also a 
source of their prestige and moral authority.  Any major format change would risk 
reducing their effectiveness18 and undermining the international support they enjoy.  ICTs 
are best viewed as a potentially useful transition justice tool, but one that is not sufficient 
in itself.  Other mechanisms are better suited to achieving goals beyond 
retribution/deterrence.  
3.  Limitations of ICT-Based Retribution as a Transitional Justice Tool 
 Even when they are not viewed as all-encompassing solutions, ICTs often face 
additional problems.  The benefits of classical adjudication may be reduced in non-
western contexts.  An ICT’s punitive focus can disrupt efforts at national reconciliation, 
and its inflexible procedures can be inadequate in the face of world-changing crimes like 
genocide.  Even if these problems are overcome, the significant monetary cost of 
 
16 As Hannah Arendt accurately underscored in the 1960s when commenting on the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann.  HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 20 (1963).  See also, Minow, supra note _ at 46-
47. 
17 See, e.g., Minow, supra note _ at 47. 
18 Martha Minow convincingly argues to serve the ultimate goals of retribution/deterrence—building moral 
order based on human rights—ICTS must be scrupulously fair—e.g. imbued with relatively inflexible 
procedural safeguards.  Id. at 50. 
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courtroom procedures can also divert funding away from other needed transitional justice 
mechanisms. 
ICTs’ reliance on western courtroom procedures is comforting for western donors 
who pay for the institutions.  The courtroom setting is a familiar one, and in western 
societies it symbolizes the imposition of law’s order over the chaos of everyday life.19 
But the positive connotations of courtroom settings may not translate to citizens of 
developing countries who are not exposed to western courtroom models.  Even if they 
have been so exposed, these models may either signify colonialism of the worst sort,20 or 
resemble domestic tribunals that sport the external trappings of western courtrooms 
without possessing key intangibles like judicial independence.21 
Beyond the specific problems inherent to translation of the trial format, its 
confrontational approach may actually be detrimental to efforts at reconciliation.22 The 
adversary nature of a trial can often underscore divisions that caused civil conflicts and 
traumas in the first place.  The focus of any trial court on the fate of a specific defendant 
makes it difficult to provide the context and nuance necessary for a balanced appreciation 
of a particular area’s recent history.23 More generally, understanding a conflict’s history 
through the actions of defendants at war crimes trials can be among the most 
 
19 Of course, even in western societies, minority communities and others who frequently appear as 
defendants may be less impressed by the majesty of the law.  But representatives of these communities are 
unlikely to be on transitional justice funding committees. 
20 In many developing countries a western style court system was either introduced by the colonial power 
or designed in imitation of western courts.  See, e.g., John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in 
Vietnam:  A Comparative Analysis 30 STAN. J. INT’L LAW 325, 239 (1994). 
21 See, e.g., CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT ON 
ATTACKS ON JUSTICE (1999); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE:
PROMISES AND PITFALLS FOR A “NEW MODEL” 20 (2003) [hereinafter PROMISES AND PITFALLS]. 
22 See Minow, supra note _ at 26. 
23 Minow, supra note _ at 47.; Arendt, supra note _ . at 19. 
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inflammatory of the multiple perspectives through which it is possible to view national 
traumas. 
By punishing individual political leaders who often enjoy or enjoyed significant 
popular support, ICTs can also exacerbate existing tensions by creating public 
resentment, potentially turning defendants into martyr figures.24 The all or nothing sense 
communicated by guilty verdicts and subsequent punishment leaves little room for 
nuanced understandings and political compromises.  Though international tribunals judge 
partisans on all sides of the conflict25 the resentment caused by individual trials can cause 
significant dissension in societies attempting to recover from trauma.26 The fact that 
most international tribunals are located outside the areas they are judging (except for the 
Sierra Leone Special Court) can exacerbate these resentments even more. 
Even assuming that courtroom adjudication can bring many benefits, the 
opportunity cost is not inconsequential.  International tribunals are very expensive.  The 
annual budget for the ICC is set at sixty-six million EUR (about eighty eight million US 
$)27, while the ICTR’s 2004-05 budget is set at two hundred thirty one million dollars.28 
These are sums that could be and often aren’t spent on other types of transitional justice 
initiatives.  The high costs of international tribunals drain limited international 
development/justice funds that might otherwise be directed towards activities that more 
effectively promote reconciliation and development. 
 
24 Minow, supra note_ at 45. 
25 See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Kosovo Chief Surrendering to Hague Tribunal, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005 at 
A14; Marlise Simons, At Halfway Point in Milosevic Trial, Prosecutor is Confident, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 29, 
2004 at A4. 
26 See, e.g., PROMISES AND PITFALLS supra note_ at 5-7. 
27 Press Release, State Parties to International Criminal Court End Session by Approving 2005 Budget 
(2004). 
28 See ICTR, GENERAL INFORMATION (2005), at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm. 
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The high costs of running international tribunals also mean that the actual reach of 
these organizations is relatively limited.  The Yugoslav ICT, after 12 years of operation 
has publicly indicted a total of 117 individuals.29 The ICTR has indicted 64 individuals 
and tried 48, while the Sierra Leone Special Court has indicted 9 individuals.30 While 
these efforts are still ongoing, it is clear from both their mandates31 and their financial 
resources that they will try only a very limited selection of individuals.32 This leaves 
large numbers of victims and perpetrators relatively untouched by courtroom processes, 
aside from any outreach activities33 or media reports. 
The limited reach of international criminal tribunals is related to a final 
shortcoming.  Trial courts, developed to judge disputes on a domestic level, may not have 
the capacity to effectively judge crimes like genocide.  Reducing crimes like genocide to 
courtroom recitations of facts and standard, individual criminal sentences, may end up 
diminishing their world-shaking tragedy.34 Transitional justice mechanisms that focus on 
historical understanding and reconciliation may be a better response to crimes like 
genocide. 
C. Government Sponsored TRCs 
1.  TRC Advantages 
 
29 See ICTY, ICTY AT A GLANCE (2005), at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm. 
30 NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF ICTR, pg. 2; SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, BASIC FACTS, (2005), 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/basicfactspamphlet.pdf. 
31 See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html; PROMISES AND PITFALLS supra note_ at 2-3. 
32 Minow, supra note _ at 45. 
33 Even the limited outreach activities that are authorized are not always considered essential—the 
Management Committee of the Sierra Leone Special Court totally eliminated the Outreach department’s 
budget, “due to a perception that outreach was not an essential component of the Special Court”.  HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 34 (2004). 
34 For more discussion of this see, e.g., Minow, supra note _ at 47 (discussing Hannah Arendt’s views on 
the limits of the law in the face of genocide).  
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TRCs greatest advantage is their ability to be flexible in the identity and number of 
transitional justice aims they address.35 Thus, depending on local circumstances, TRCs 
can focus on victim voice/compensation, history writing and/or other reconciliation-
focused activities.  The most well known nationally sponsored TRC, in South Africa, 
focused on three primary functions: compiling a historical record, promoting 
reconciliation and granting amnesties to individuals who provided a full account of their 
actions.36 While it is heavily criticized within South Africa,37 this TRC is often held up 
as a model in other countries.38 The relatively peaceful transition of South Africa from 
apartheid regime to functioning democratic state is one reason for this praise; but the 
flexibility and broad reach of the TRC is another.  The South African TRC focused on 
promoting reconciliation and compiling an accurate historical record, rather than on 
punishing perpetrators.  Even its Amnesty Committee, the most “judicial” part of the 
enterprise, focused on understanding the full extent of crimes committed rather than 
punishing individual perpetrators.39 
Other TRCs have focused on different issues.  Some of the Latin American 
Commissions, for example, focused almost exclusively on compiling accurate historical 
records.40 The Sierra Leonean TRC was able to launch some reconciliation activities 
 
35 Unlike ICTs, TRCs are not constrained by long-standing traditions regarding their form, making any 
negative consequences of innovation much less severe. 
36 See Wilson, supra note_ at 21. 
37 See Hayner, supra note_ at 42-44. 
38 Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, in TRUTH 
V. JUSTICE 5 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
39 The Amnesty Committee, using the explicit threat of future prosecutions, was able to persuade at least 
some perpetrators to admit their crimes without using explicit punitive means.  In this sense, the TRC is 
less efficient at using retribution, but can be a useful adjunct in a retribution process. 
40 See, e.g., Hayner, supra note _ at 50-72. 
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based on local tribal traditions, rather than western models.41 This form of respect for 
traditional cultures could significantly impact the effectiveness of any transitional justice 
institution—but is not available to ICTs like the ICC, whose structure requires use of 
“universal” norms and procedures imposed by their western origins.42 These variances in 
TRC operation demonstrate that different national approaches are possible using the same 
general framework.   
The additional flexibility that TRCs provide is actually cheaper than the services of 
ICTs, and can directly impact many more people.  The various TRC committees in South 
Africa involved about twenty one thousand individuals directly,43 and were sufficiently 
relevant to receive very wide television and radio coverage.44 All of this was 
accomplished at a cost of about eighteen million US dollars a year,45 significantly less 
than ICTs like the ICTY and ICTR.  If they operate effectively, TRCs seem to offer much 
greater value for money than ICTs.  
 2.  Challenges to TRCs 
Accusations of local partisanship are the most significant challenge facing TRCs. 
Even the well-regarded South African Commission was subject to accusations of partisan 
behavior.  The domination of South Africa by the ANC government made other parties 
suspicious of “special favors” being given to government parties.46 Similarly, in Sierra 
Leone the TRC Executive Secretary was credibly accused of altering the final report to 
 
41 See, e.g., Rosalind Shaw, Project Summary:  Forgive and Forget: Rethinking Memory in Sierra Leone's 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004), available at http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/ 
2004/0429_shaw.html; Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official 
(April 30, 2005). 
42 See generally, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9*, available in http://www.un.org/icc, reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998). 
43 Hayner, supra note_ at 42. 
44 Id. at 42. 
45 Id. at 41. 
46 See, e.g., ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL 164-72 (2000); Minow, supra note _ at 83. 
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remove accusations damaging to the government.47 TRCs local origins and actors, as 
well as the absence of formal distancing mechanisms that apply in international criminal 
tribunal settings, make it harder to avoid these types of pressures and suspicions.  
Sponsorship by national governments exacerbates the problem even more by making one 
interested party directly involved in appointing and managing (at some level) the 
operations of the TRC. 
The problems stemming from local involvement are not limited to the political 
pressures that governments are able to exercise.  In certain cases, a lack of external 
monitoring can lead to corruption and nepotism that interferes with the TRC’s primary 
mission.  Especially if a national government sponsors the TRC, it can be harder to 
insulate the organization from broader societal problems.  In Sierra Leone for example, 
the TRC’s commissioners and staff were accused of petty personal corruption and larger 
scale mismanagement of funds.48 This posed both operational challenges, given the 
TRCs very limited budget, and broader reputational concerns.  Even in cases where 
corruption does not actually take place, an established local culture of corruption can lead 
to widespread suspicions of illegality, especially if no credible outside guarantee of 
honesty is provided. 
A final major problem facing TRCs when compared to ICTs is a relative lack of 
prestige.49 In Sierra Leone for example, where a TRC and a Special Court operated 
simultaneously, the Special Court was accorded much more prestige and respect.50 Part 
of this differential in respect may be due to the carefully stage-managed “majesty of the 
 
47 Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official (April 30, 2005). 
48 Id.
49 This was not the case in South Africa, where Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s record as an anti-apartheid 
crusader was an important reason for the TRCs success.  See generally, Krog, supra note _.  
50 See, e.g., A FRESH START?, supra note_ at 10. 
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law”, that provides the actions of lawyers and the courts with a protective layer of 
gravitas.51 But another reason is the relative independence, efficiency and perceived 
honesty that international criminal tribunals (excluding the ICTR) possess, partially 
deriving from the international sponsorship of these institutions.52 While TRCs may have 
difficulty tapping into the cultivated and specific gravitas associated with courtroom 
settings, they could access the prestige associated with more extensive international 
sponsorship and support. 53 
Additional international involvement in the organization of tribunals can ameliorate 
each of the three main problems identified in this sub-section—government domination, 
corruption and a lack of respect.  This involvement can also address a final challenge that 
nationally sponsored TRCs face:  obtaining sufficient foreign sponsorship.  TRCs 
problems with community respect and sub-standard management partially stem from a 
relative lack of resources.  In Sierra Leone for example, the Special Court’s budget was 
 
51 See, e.g., Sonnenfeldt, supra note _ at 76.    
52 Compare A FRESH START?, supra note _ at 8-9 (“Funding problems have dogged the TRC since its 
inception….the lack of funding has several reasons…. Donors do need confidence that a worthy cause is 
also an operational and effective one….The Special Court…gives the impression of being organized and 
competent in managing its task”) and  PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note_ at 20  (“UN Security Council 
Resolution 1470 (March 2003), which expressed ‘strong support’ for the Special Court and requested 
cooperation with it, ‘made a difference in the way we are perceived’, says the Registrar, Robin Vincent.”) 
53 More generally, TRCs also stand accused of certain additional failings.  Many have been explicitly or 
implicitly associated with Christian institutions or individuals, and apply an “individual therapy” model 
that may be culturally inappropriate.  They also offer fewer retributive options than court systems and their 
short duration may preclude long-term solutions to causes of violence.  These issues are not directly 
addressed in this paper.  However, it is worth noting that the Christian and individual therapy issues might 
be reduced through a strong international organization like the ITRC, that enshrined the idea of flexibility 
as a hallmark for TRCs (e.g. a flexibility to use non-individual therapy approaches).  Whether to use 
religious representatives as leaders would probably be a function of individual TRCs operating agreements, 
discussed in Section IV infra. It is true that TRCs offer fewer retributive choices than courts (aside from 
shaming and potentially judging amnesty applications) but this can also be a positive role, as the discussion 
of punitive sanctions demonstrates—and the presence of a TRC does not prevent the formation of a court to 
play these punitive roles.  Finally, in terms of providing long-term solutions to fundamental issues, writing 
histories and promoting reconciliation seem like a good start in addressing these problems.  Compensation 
to victims may also play a positive role.  In the context of an integrated attempt to address fundamental 
causes of violence, TRCs can play a positive, if not all-encompassing role.  As is discussed in Section III 
infra, the ITRC may help TRCs extend their long-term impact by supervising post TRC activities on 
national/area levels. 
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more than twenty times that of the TRC.54 Thus the TRC’s corruption problems were 
compounded by an absolute lack of resources—reducing its ability to engage in 
reconciliation and history writing activities that could have made the organization more 
successful.55 In addition, the finance differential with the Special Court contributed to 
perceptions of the TRC as the less powerful and effective of the two bodies.56 
International sponsorship could help break this deadlock through release of additional 
donor funds to support TRC activities. 
The theoretical promise of TRCs makes it imperative to identify means of making 
these organizations more effective.  The historical legitimacy of the courtroom model, 
and the current failures of TRCs, mean that ICTs receive more international attention and 
support—which leads to a problematic focus on retribution over other transitional justice 
goals.  Internationalizing local TRCs, while not solving all of their problems, would be 
one step towards achieving a fuller panoply of transitional justice goals.57 
54 Compare A FRESH START?, supra note _ at 8 and PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note_ at 15 n.91. 
55 Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official (April 30, 2005). 
56 See A FRESH START?, supra note _ at 9-10. 
57 Providing increased international support to TRCs is not an unheard of idea.  In the case of the Sierra 
Leone TRC for example, the International Crisis Group urged that the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) play a substantial guidance role, including seconding officials to the TRC.  A 
FRESH START?, supra note _ at 10. 
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III.  An ITRC Alternative 
 
A. Fundamental Principles 
 
A major challenge for any new transitional justice body is preserving the 
advantages of ICTs and TRCs while avoiding their weaknesses.  In some cases, it may 
not be possible to remove all weak links.  The local ties that can make TRCs especially 
effective are also a major reason for their susceptibility to political pressure and 
corruption.  Addressing these problems involves insulating TRCs from local pressures as 
much as possible while still maintaining their ability to flexibly integrate local customs.  
It is unlikely that this balance will be achieved without some compromise of either local 
links or moral credibility/respect. 
The subsections below describe the parameters of one potential new transitional 
justice institution.  The ITRC will attempt to vest the advantages that ICTs enjoy in 
TRCs.  It will also encourage the formation of additional national TRCs.  The most basic 
challenge for the new organization is balancing central control and local innovation.  The 
proposed legal structure of the ITRC seeks to address this and other challenges.  In 
addition to balancing local engagement and internationally sponsored independence, the 
ITRC will also need to focus on imparting other advantages associated with ICTs to 
TRCs:  efficient administration; additional moral authority in and outside the areas within 
which they operate and improved access to western financial resources.  Finally, the 
ITRC will need to carefully manage its relations with both national court systems and the 
ICC. 
B. Possible Structure 
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1.  Central Structures 
 
The ITRC’s high level organization will be central to its chances of success.  An 
international convention with broad international participation should establish the ITRC 
and its basic operational parameters.  The convention will identify the main purposes of 
the ITRC as well as indicate particular roles that should be played by different parts of 
the organization. 
The ITRC should be launched through an international treaty.  Unlike the ICC, which 
needed to deal with issues of jurisdiction, this treaty would not be strictly necessary for 
the ITRC to operate.  Nonetheless an international treaty (as opposed to starting as a sub-
component of the United Nations or as an independent NGO) would bring several 
significant advantages.  Most directly, the treaty could commit individual signers to 
specific levels of financial support.  It could also be useful when national governments 
consider whether to accept the operations of a TRC—their countries being party to the 
ITRC treaty may make them more amenable to accepting the ITRC and its terms.58 
Finally a public declaration of support could serve as a powerful symbol of the 
international community’s acceptance of TRC-type processes.59 
Setting up the ITRC as a direct subsidiary organization of the UN would also have 
certain advantages:  it might be easier to set up quickly, and would not require a time 
consuming effort to gain support from diverse countries (who might be wary of 
additional financial commitments).  In addition, it might avoid having its mission diluted 
during negotiations by signing parties.  But this route also brings significant 
 
58 Though a country would not need to have signed the ITRC treaty in order for it to agree to an ITRC 
sponsored TRC. 
59 This acceptance would be particularly powerful if the United States could be induced to join.  This type 
of support might be a first step in convincing the US government to provide additional assistance to 
multilateral organizations concerned with transitional justice. 
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disadvantages:  no opportunity for the international community to concretely demonstrate 
their commitment by joining the ITRC organization; and exposure to UN politics and 
funding troubles.  In addition, not having a firm basis in an international treaty may 
expose the ITRC to greater political pressures and problems after it begins operations, 
distracting from its central mission and detracting from its credibility.60 Avoiding these 
problems justifies keeping the ITRC separate from the UN. 
In the long-term, the ICC and the ITRC may wish to formalize any cooperation they 
establish, either through a separate formal agreement between institutions or by setting up 
a new umbrella transitional justice institution that encompasses both the ICC and ITRC.  
But any formalization of cooperation between the two institutions should occur after they 
actually function.  This delay should ensure that the actual operational characteristics of 
both institutions are taken into account in any resulting agreement. 
An ITRC treaty will also need to identify the types of issues TRCs can address and 
the roles they could play.  This will almost inevitably be a source of controversy and 
negotiation, but any agreement should at least include establishing historical truth; 
assisting with societal reconciliation; deciding compensation claims; and helping to 
determine amnesty applications.61 This list should be made neither exclusive not 
required.  Instead, it should be left to the ITRC secretariat, in negotiations with individual 
national/regional partners, to establish the exact scope of individual TRC operations.  
These should be left very flexible, to allow a focus on the individual challenges facing 
 
60 This danger seems more immediate than any jockeying at treaty negotiations.  Given the ITRCs 
dependence on national government approval, it may not face the same kind of restrictions that limited the 
ICCs scope. 
61 E.g. the main foci of the South African TRC effort. 
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specific countries.62 Nonetheless, the treaty should underscore the fact that the ITRC will 
not function as a trial court or assign penalties.  This will be important in both 
differentiating the ITRC from other transitional justice institutions and providing it with 
the credibility to approach parties that are suspicious of international courts and their 
jurisdiction (a group that includes the United States government). 
Any treaty establishing the ITRC should identify those functions that will be served 
by the organization’s central headquarters and those performed by individual TRCs.  
Making this division of labor explicit will help convince individual governments to 
refrain from attempting to negotiate separate “deals” that stop the ITRC from 
implementing general policies it deems appropriate.  Instead, the ITRC can simply point 
to the legal context on which it began as explanation for a refusal to negotiate.  These 
centralized efforts should probably cover a number of different activities--including 
centralized policy formation, staff assignments, liaisons with national governments and 
NGOs/IOs (for funding and operational purposes), sponsoring research into TRCs 
running/impact and even assisting with certain functions like centralized purchasing (to 
reduce costs of items like office furniture for individual TRCs).  The central headquarters 
itself might be based in a city with other international organizations working on 
important issues of transitional justice—The Hague for example.  Alternatively, it could 
be based in a city not associated with international law and/or international legal 
tribunals—in order to underscore that TRCs serve separate functions from the 
institutions. 
 
62 This flexibility will allow appropriate incorporation (or non-incorporation) of potentially controversial 
figures like religious leaders, whose appropriate role may differ in different areas. 
22
One of the most important functions for the ITRC headquarters will be centralized 
policy formation.  The ITRC headquarters can help shield individual TRCs from 
government pressures by establishing clear and undeviating policies on important issues 
like nepotism, corruption and waste of donor resources.  These centralized policies can 
guarantee that individual donor contributions are not wasted, and shield TRCs from 
internal accusations of corruption and favoritism that undermine their work. 
In addition to promoting centralized policy formation, the ITRC headquarters should 
also train and develop a core group of staff members with experience in a wide variety of 
settings.  While individual TRCs should generally employ local staff with experience in 
particular regions, these centralized staff can help provide institutional memory about the 
different ways in which TRCs function most effectively, as well how to best implement 
central policies applicable to all TRCs the ITRC sponsors. 
A third function that a centralized ITRC headquarters should play is liaising with 
national governments and other transnational institutions to coordinate funding and 
operational support for individual TRCs.  This coordinating function will be especially 
important when both the ITRC and ICC are focusing on the same conflict, and should 
allow the institutions to avoid disrupting the other’s work.  The ITRC will also be in an 
excellent position to lobby for additional donations to TRCs and understand which 
entities are most likely to donate to particular projects.  The ITRC can help guarantee 
these donors an effective deployment of their resources through its control of the 
operational features of the ITRCs. 
In addition to creating specific policies and relationships, the ITRC headquarters 
should also serve as an important center for academic research on TRCs and their 
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function.  By encouraging academics and others to use its records and by sponsoring 
research into TRCs, the ITRC can help keep itself close to the best academic thinking 
about the function of TRCs and innovative ways in which they may be able to function.  
One potential resource to help create this atmosphere would be a centralized archive with 
copies of documents and other products created by individual TRCs. 
A final, more mundane function is helping to control costs at individual TRCs 
through policies of centralized purchasing.  This type of activity may help to lower the 
operating costs of individual institutions, allowing for additional activities on the part of 
TRCs and perhaps encouraging additional donations by demonstrating good value for 
donor cash. 
2. Local Structures 
ITRC headquarters will play a leading role in setting up, supporting and building 
on the activities of national TRCs.  The credibility and financial planning assistance that 
the ITRC provides to TRCs it sponsors should help convince individual governments to 
accept ITRC involvement in their countries, even if this makes individual TRCs more 
independent and less amenable to pressure by these governments.  Eventually, the ITRC 
may be influential enough that international donors refuse to recognize TRCs that don’t 
meet ITRC standards.  The multilateral governance of the ITRC should help it to respond 
to accusations of being a front for western colonialist tendencies. 
The first stage in a local effort by the ITRC will involve setting up an individual 
TRC organization.  This will involve discussions with the national government and civil 
society actors—talks that might be initiated by either the ITRC or other societal actors 
depending on circumstances.  If ITRC representatives are satisfied that the country (or 
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region/area—there is no specific a priori reason to reject a multinational or sub-national 
TRC) is an appropriate location for a TRC, they will attempt to sign an operating 
agreement with the national government concerned.  Any such agreement will need 
approval from individual areas’ civil society representatives—opposition parties, press 
and other groups.  The agreement will help identify the specific aims of the TRC—such 
as historical record creation, amnesty adjudication and the like--as well as the operating 
procedures for the TRC and the role of the ITRC and its representatives. 
The actual running of the TRC will be a second stage in this process.  The ITRC 
will almost always63 employ individuals from the area concerned, especially in roles 
relating to the actual hearing of cases.  Thus individuals like TRC commissioners who 
hear amnesty applications or adjudicate reconciliation efforts, and investigators who help 
determine a historical record, will often be drawn almost entirely from national 
populations (though foreign representation may also be allowed).  At the same time, the 
professional staff of the TRC—who deal with issues like human resources, finances and 
the like—will be supervised by ITRC employees who have been trained and are paid by 
the ITRC.  These individuals will help ensure that the TRC operates in an efficient, 
honest manner and is at least partially shielded from efforts to corrupt the process.  The 
ITRC representatives will also retain the ability to fire individual TRC employees 
(including national commissioners) who contravene specific TRC regulations.  These 
powers will help to maintain the status of the TRC and its reputation both within its 
operational area and with international donors. 
 
63 In some cases, as with the El Salvador TRC, it may be determined that a purely foreign staff is more 
appropriate, see Hayner, supra note_ at 219-20, but this would be a drastic step to take. 
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A final local role for the ITRC will be after the cessation of a national TRC’s 
activities.  The ITRC and its representatives/employees will assist in the dissemination of 
any TRC findings and also in the coordination of follow up reconciliation, truth-seeking 
and legal activities.  It could also help supervise or assist with the distribution of any 
long-term compensation payments awarded by the TRC, allowing victims to bypass 
fragile and often corrupt national governments. The ITRC’s continuing presence will 
make it easier to ensure that the achievements of TRCs are not lost once they cease to 
operate.  It will also make it easier to study the impact of TRCs more generally. 
One of the important principles the ITRC will need to respect in its local 
operations is adaptability.  Though its staff will enforce general policies on issues like 
nepotism and bribery, they will also need to encourage flexibility in responses to the 
individual issues TRCs face.  Rather than importing operational models wholesale from 
previous TRCs, international staff will need to work with local experts to help devise 
approaches and rituals that respect and incorporate elements of local culture.  This 
flexibility will be crucial to the eventual success of individual TRCs. 
3. Coordination with Court Systems 
 
In creating multiple local TRC organizations, the ITRC will need to coordinate 
effectively with both national court systems and the ICC.  Local TRCs will be much more 
successful if their activities support and complement the activities of court based justice 
efforts.  By establishing strong guidelines and monitoring cooperation, the ITRC can help 
ensure that the coordination between court systems and local TRCs is mutually 
beneficial. 
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Coordinating with national court systems will require flexible guidelines given the 
diversity in both formal and actual function of different countries’ court systems.  Any 
local TRC agreement will need to spell out the interaction of the TRC and local courts, 
including the use of evidence from one institution by the other and the enforceability of 
agreements made in a TRC context (including amnesty and compensation procedures).  
In certain countries, well-run local TRCs can help inspire or even sponsor changes in 
local court systems to make them more efficient and fairer to all parties. 
Local court systems will vary significantly in both their institutional design and 
actual operation.  The exact interaction between these systems and local TRCs will thus 
be specific to the country involved.  But in all cases, the parameters of this cooperation 
should be spelled out in the initial agreement with a local government when a TRC is set 
up.  This will ensure that the operations of both the TRC and local courts are not unduly 
affected by the institutions’ concurrent operation. 
One of the most important issues that agreements with national governments will 
need to cover involves the use of evidence from TRCs and the legal status of any 
amnesty/compensation decisions by the TRC.  The specific terms of this agreement will 
greatly depend on the exact functions of the TRC.  But in general, information 
volunteered by perpetrators as part of reconciliation processes and the like will probably 
need given special protection in order to encourage participation in TRC events.64 
Additionally, any amnesties issued by a local TRC committee will need to be recognized 
by local court systems in order to have any valid impact.  These protections for 
 
64 In Sierra Leone, perpetrators were reluctant to come before the TRC for fear of subsequent prosecution.  
Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official (April 30, 2005).  .  Given 
the unique reconciliation functions of the TRC, providing immunity to confessions made in carefully 
controlled circumstances will be appropriate, though there will probably be significant disagreements about 
what the parameters of these controlled circumstances are. 
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perpetrators may reduce the power and prestige of local court systems, making pre-
arrangements essential. 
Other types of interactions with local court systems will be more supportive of 
their role.  For example, the compensation committees of local TRCs may rely on local 
court systems to help in enforcing payments—by either government or private entities 
(depending on the structure and scope of any local TRC compensation function).  
Additionally, the TRC may be able to provide training and support to local court systems 
in areas like victim support, reconciliation functions and even evidence and document 
management.  Any cooperation/support in these areas could bring major benefits to local 
court systems and encourage cooperation with the TRC. 
The ICC is the second institution with which cooperation agreements will be 
essential.65 ICC cooperation will need to be negotiated on both global and national levels 
(and these agreements may also need to be extended to regional tribunals and courts like 
the ICTY, depending on a given local TRC’s location).  Ensuring that the two institutions 
don’t undermine each others’ efforts will be the most pressing challenge to both types of 
agreements.  As discussed earlier in this paper, the relationship with the ICC may 
continue to evolve and even become more formalized.  But any formalization of 
extensive linkages will occur after both institutions have become fully operational. 
Agreements with the ICC on macro and national levels will need to focus on 
ensuring that neither institution compromises the operations of the other.  The threat to 
TRC operations is most immediate—amnesty and reconciliation processes could be 
significantly disrupted if the ICC chooses to ignore any grants of amnesty or uses 
 
65 This discussion focuses on the ICC, but its general principles could be applied to national ICTs like the 
ICTR as well. 
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information provided in confidential TRC processes.  Additionally, the ITRC will need to 
ensure that all components of the ICC—including both prosecution and defense 
counsels—respect the parameters of local TRC operations.  But ITRC action could also 
compromise ICC investigations, by reducing national support for court actions 
(especially when these clash with popular TRC processes).  These potential problems 
make it important for both institutions to craft specific guidelines on effective 
coordination of their activities. 
On a global level, the ICC and the ITRC should agree on specific guidelines that 
will govern the means and order by which the ICC and ITRC approach areas of conflict.  
In many cases, especially where the ITRC is playing an amnesty function, allowing ICC 
investigations after the TRC has completed its work may be most efficient.  This will 
allow the ICC to respect any amnesty decisions made by the TRC, making cooperation 
with the latter more attractive than it might otherwise be.  TRCs may also be better able 
to time their work if spared from the vagaries of courtroom procedure (e.g. defense 
counsel objections to TRC testimony etc.).  In other cases however, it may be more 
appropriate for TRCs to play a role only after judicial investigations.  In any case, the 
exact parameters of these timing decisions should be decided on a case-by-case basis.  A 
semi-permanent committee composed of neutrals and representatives of both ITRC and 
ICC could evaluate individual cases, basing their decisions on a set of pre-determined 
factors.  These might include the specifics of the situation, desires of local 
government/civil society, logistical/funding restraints/priorities of the two institutions and 
the nature of the trauma and its aftermath.  The increased flexibility provided by this 
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case-specific evaluation is sufficient to outweigh the risk of conflict created by the 
absence of hard rules of priority. 
A global ICC/ITRC agreement, in addition to putting in place procedures for 
managing approaches to specific conflicts, should also encourage more widespread 
dialogue.  Ideally, it would set up frequent general consultations on institutional levels—
involving both the Registry and centralized prosecutorial teams from the ICC.66 This 
type of consultation may encourage broader cooperation and prevent acrimonious 
disputes from arising. 
After any agreement about general approaches to conflicts is crafted, additional 
agreements should also be concluded between the ICC and local TRCs.  These can 
provide additional local assurances about the integrity of specific reconciliation/amnesty 
processes.  Local agreements can also take into account specific local concerns/interests.  
The danger for both ICC and local TRCs is that local factors make the other institutions 
unpopular, rendering any linkage perilous.  But this may give both institutions an 
incentive to support each other’s activities, and in any case the benefits of this type of 
agreement exceed any publicity costs. 
 
66 Defense counsel are case specific, and thus more appropriately involved in local agreements. 
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IV.  Benefits and Challenges 
A. Benefits 
 
The most quantifiable benefit of the ITRCs formation would be an increase in the 
number of TRCs that are formed.  The presence of a recognized, well supported 
multilateral organization supporting and advocating for the creation of national TRCs 
would be a strong spur to governments and civil society groups in societies recovering 
from trauma.  The ITRC’s specific support of academic research on the good functioning 
of TRCs may also create additional awareness and support for their creation.  These 
additional TRCs can help transitional societies in a way that provides maximum 
flexibility to take into account local needs while avoiding hijackings by local political 
figures.  The beneficial impact of additional TRC formation assumes that the 
organizations actually are beneficial;67 that any displacement of international 
judicial/retributive efforts and alternative fora for activities like writing history, 
encouraging reconciliation and adjudicating amnesty requests is an acceptable loss;68 and 
that the ITRC will do a better job than national efforts at creating effective TRCs.  But 
these conditions are met by the ITRC proposal, making the formation of additional TRCs 
a net positive. 
A second benefit of the ITRCs formation will be that national TRCs become more 
independent, honest and efficient than those of the past.  Run subject to the rules and 
supervision of the ITRC and its staff, individual TRCs are less likely to be “captured” by 
local interests foreign to the major purposes of the TRC.  Pressures on individual TRCs 
 
67 See analysis in section B supra.
68 Section C.v. includes additional analysis of the impact this proposal could have on the ICC.  
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by local political leaders seeking to avoid/obtain certain types of hearings, amnesties or 
other “goods” will be less effective when subject to approval by international staff, and 
when the ITRC is able to condemn governments/individuals that engage in this conduct.  
Nepotism and corruption will also be reduced by the presence of foreign staff controlling 
access to funds and vetting individual hiring and expenditures.  While these staff and 
guidelines will probably not be able to eliminate all political or corruption-promoting 
pressures/efforts, they should constitute a significant obstacle to them. 
With the burdens of political compromises and corruption lightened, individual 
TRCs will also be able to attract additional donor support.  The ITRC seal may help 
assure individual donors that their funds will be well spent and that the TRC is actually 
carrying out the functions that it claims to.  Accusations concerning corruption and 
nepotism that often dog nationally sponsored TRCs69 would be less frequent and less 
convincing in cases where the ITRC denies the charges.  These benefits may help make 
ITRC restrictions and checks more amenable than they otherwise would be. 
The benefits of ITRC sponsorship will not end with the conclusion of the TRC.  
Instead, the continuing existence of the ITRC will make it much simpler to run follow up 
projects to the TRC.  These can range from the mundane, like assuring proper authorship 
and distribution of any reports the TRC writes, to more imaginative and unusual efforts 
like the sponsorship of artistic reactions to TRC reports.  Currently, the disbanding of a 
TRC (usually having exhausted all financial resources devoted to it) often means that 
 
69 See, e.g., A FRESH START?, supra note _ at 5-8. 
32
efforts to respond to and address the material the TRC created and unearthed are ad hoc 
and small scale.70 Appropriate ITRC encouragement and support could change this. 
A third benefit to the ITRCs post-TRC engagement will be additional 
opportunities to assess the successes and failures of individual initiatives sponsored by 
particular TRCs.  Individual national innovations can be catalogued and evaluated for 
possible use in other contexts.  While these efforts happen now, they are often ad hoc and 
uncoordinated.71 
A final benefit to the ITRC will be additional multinational engagement on the 
part of countries, like the United States, that are currently suspicious of efforts to create 
international courts.  The relatively non-legal, non-coercive nature of the TRCs should 
make membership and support of the ITRC much more palatable for these countries 
(ironically, they may be especially eager to participate as a way of avoiding the public 
opprobrium associated with a refusal to be party to the ICC…).  This participation will be 
useful in terms of TRC formation in the short term.  In the long term it could also be a 
step towards eventual reconciliation with the idea of international justice institutions like 
the ICC.  Even major proponents of ICTs may support membership in the ITRC as a way 
of demonstrating the innocuous nature of international transitional justice efforts. 
All of these improvements in the actual functioning of TRCs will help to improve 
their moral authority both internally and internationally.  TRCs that are more respected 
will be able to function more effectively and attract more donor support, creating a 
 
70 In Sierra Leone, for example, follow up efforts to the TRC were not centrally coordinated and had a hard 
time obtaining support.  Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official 
(April 30, 2005).  See generally Hayner, supra note _ at 228-30. 
71 There is currently no central archive for all TRC materials.  Instead there are various regional and local 
attempts to store archives, which are sometimes insufficient to protect the material.  In South Africa, for 
example, key files disappeared.  More Truth Commission Files Disappear, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Oct. 25, 
2002. 
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virtuous self-reinforcing cycle.  The intervention of the ITRC can in this sense be the spur 
for a much larger improvement in national TRC effectiveness at multiple levels. 
B. Major Challenges 
 
The ITRC will most threaten two different groups:  ICTs and national governments.  
It will almost inevitably weaken ICTs that remain independent of its jurisdiction.  
National governments will also be weakened by the ITRC’s assumption of responsibility 
for institutions that have hitherto been mostly controlled by governments.  International 
support for TRCs will make them more effective, but less likely to provide patronage and 
prestige to national governments. 
Weakening some existing institutions is almost inevitable.  The key consideration is 
whether the transfer of resources like to the ITRC will ultimately better advance the aims 
of transitional justice.  By this criterion, the ITRC seems well placed to prevail.  A 
flexible, locally-based but internationally supported approach would replace ICTs in 
cases where it worked better.  Weakening of national governments might be more 
destabilizing, but even here, the potential benefits are significant enough to justify the 
tradeoff.72 
1.  International Criminal Courts/Tribunals 
The formation of the ITRC will provide a convincing alternative to international 
criminal trials in countries emerging from trauma and violence.  While the ITRC will 
probably form TRCs in areas that would otherwise have had neither an international court 
nor a TRC, in other cases it will probably take the place of an ICC investigation or 
international criminal tribunal.  It is not a foregone conclusion that the two types of 
 
72 In cases where the international community is particularly concerned about government 
stability/credibility, it can provide additional support through non-TRC means.  Individual operating 
agreements with governments can also be sensitive to particular needs of national governments. 
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efforts are incompatible.  Indeed, the South African TRC, often considered one of the 
most successful,73 conducted its amnesty hearings under the explicit expectation that it 
would be followed by criminal trials of those not granted amnesty.74 In this sense, 
organizations like the ICC and the ITRC could come to cooperative agreements in 
particular circumstances—with the ICC, for example, agreeing to suspend indictments 
until the conclusion of a particular national TRC, and to respect decisions of its amnesty 
committee.75 Other types of cooperation could also be possible, helping both institutions 
operate more effectively.  Under this scenario, the ITRC could represent an improvement 
to the international community’s transitional justice toolkit. 
But even a decision to treat the ITRC and ICTs as alternative components of a single 
transitional justice toolkit represents a significant shift in the way that international 
criminal courts are conceived.  Rather than constituting an ultimate international response 
to particular acts, organizations like the ICC would be demoted to the position of being  
one option in a toolkit of methods to address international conflict and national trauma.  
In cases where punitive/retributory needs were less important than broader goals like 
national reconciliation,76 ICTs would often not be prioritized.  This could represent a 
significant reduction in ICTs authority as institutions—which would reduce their chances 
of long-term survival.  Thus, forming the ITRC would not be a costless exercise for all 
parties—the impact on international criminal courts/tribunals would almost certainly be 
negative. 
 
73 Rotberg, supra note_ at 5. 
74 Very few trials of those denied amnesty actually took place, due to a number of political and technical 
legal factors.  See Hayner, supra note _ at 43. 
75 See generally, Hayner, supra note _ at 206-12. 
76 Which might be quite often—see Minow, supra note _, at 26, 121-26. 
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Weakening the most effective transitional justice tools currently operating seems 
risky when considered in a vacuum.  But in a context where the weakness derives directly 
from the international community’s preference for more flexible tools that focus on non-
retributory transitional justice goals, the change appears much less worrying.  ICTs and 
domestic courts will still be able to serve as tools to channel retributory impulses, should 
these be deemed significant.  But an affirmative choice to re-channel energy towards 
other goals, like victim compensation and voice, seems beneficial in the long run.  In this 
sense, a successful ITRC’s weakening of ICTs will be a hopeful rather than worrying 
sign.77 
2. National Governments 
 
The ITRC would reduce the influence of national governments over the formation 
and function of TRCs in areas they control.  The impact of a reduction in national 
governments’ power varies depending on the specific context of the area a TRC operates 
in.  But in many developing countries, national governments are relatively weak and need 
much support in order to effectively assert their national authority.  Presiding over even a 
semi-successful TRC can significantly contribute to a government’s prestige, whereas a 
full exposé of their officers’ crimes by a fully independent TRC can be very 
destabilizing.  The ITRC may in many cases be able to negotiate appropriate publicity 
opportunities for national governments that ameliorate some of the harm inherent in 
independent TRCs.  But the overall criticism of national governments’ abilities will 
remain obvious, and any “deals” will need to be limited to avoid antagonizing 
government opponents. 
 
77 More worrying would be a weakening of ICTs without a strong ITRC to take their place.  But this 
weakening is unlikely unless the ITRC is successful. 
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The limitation on national government powers may give rise to resentment, non-
cooperation and potential accusations of neocolonialism.  The extent of these problems 
would vary depending on the level of governments’ non-cooperation, and a skillful ITRC 
might be able to ameliorate many of the consequences by linking a successful TRC to a 
cooperative government—and encouraging foreign donors to reward cooperative 
governments.  But the risks of government non-cooperation will certainly be greater for 
ITRC sponsored commissions as opposed to nationally sponsored TRCs. 
In contrast to the weakening of ICTs, the weakening of national governments will 
often constitute an unambiguously negative impact of the ITRCs operation.  But this 
negative impact can be mitigated by appropriate parallel actions by the ITRC and other 
governments, and in any case is not as significant as the very real benefits that a 
successful ITRC could bring.  In particular, the ITRC’s support of local court systems 
and of national stability through reconciliation may provide greater long-term benefits 
than any short-term gains from a national government’s sharing in the glory of a less-
effective TRC.  In areas where national governments are particularly unstable, local 
TRCs could, where appropriate, provide specific publicity opportunities for them.78 In 
other cases, where the international community is particularly interested in supporting a 
national government’s stability, using means other than a TRC to provide 
prestige/support should also be considered.  This last approach will ensure that the TRC 
is not distracted from its objective of advancing core transitional justice goals like victim 
compensation and empowerment. 
 
78 These could include joint press conferences and the like.  The details would obviously depend on the 
context of any TRC’s operations, which theoretically might include investigations of government activity 
which make inappropriate any support for the government.  But in these latter cases, allowing a flawed 
government to steal other institutions’ glory is of questionable benefit anyway. 
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C. Additional Specific Challenges 
The ITRC faces a number of additional challenges.  These include the level of 
financial support that would be required, potential disruptions to the ITRC’s work and 
whether its formation is unnecessary given current efforts.  Addressing these questions is 
crucial to justifying the ITRC’s existence. 
On a financial level the ITRC faces two questions—whether the cost of 
maintaining a central organization and supporting individual TRCs is value for money 
and whether it is politically possible to actually raise the necessary support.  The 
preceding sections outline the specific benefits that TRCs provide and other institutions 
don’t.  Given the relatively modest cost of TRCs (which don’t face onerous prison, 
lawyer and other types of costs)79 they seem like a worthwhile investment. 
This section has outlined the specific benefits that the ITRC will bring in terms of 
costs—reducing corruption/nepotism and increasing centralized purchasing.  Assuming 
that TRCs are positive in general, the ITRC’s major additional costs would involve 
running a headquarters and hiring international staff for posting to foreign locations.  
Individual national TRC’s would develop their own budgets, though the ITRC would 
help with crafting and presenting fundraising strategies.  Especially in the first years, 
when the number of individual TRCs sponsored would probably be more limited, the 
number of employees could be kept to no more than one hundred or so professionals, 
with appropriate support staff.  Total support for this group might be equivalent to the 
support provided to the South African TRC—about eighteen million dollars per year.  
This would account for higher salaries and operating costs than the South African TRC 
 
79 The annual budget of the South African TRC was about eighteen million dollars per year, Hainer supra 
note_ at 223, and the total budget of the Sierra Leonean TRC was about two and a half million dollars per 
year, A FRESH START?, supra note _ at 8. 
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faced—but the money would be spread over much more limited facilities and a smaller 
staff.80 Compared to the cost of individual war crimes tribunals like the ICTR and ICTY, 
eighteen million dollars seems reasonable—providing a lot of transitional justice for 
relatively low cost.  If national governments can be convinced of the utility of TRCs, they 
can probably be convinced to direct their transitional justice aid towards the ITRC and its 
local operations.81 
A second potential challenge to the ITRC and national TRCs’ work would be 
efforts to punish perpetrators through non-international court systems, using means like 
the United States’ Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) or Belgium’s recently 
restricted universal jurisdiction law.82 These types of efforts (or even the threat of them), 
performed outside of coordinated domestic court/international court/ITRC actions, could 
disrupt the efforts of national TRCs to promote reconciliation and enforce amnesties.  But 
while this threat is real, the overall scope would be limited to a few individuals in a few 
jurisdictions, at least based on current norms.  If these extraterritorial efforts became 
more significant, some effort to change ITRC parties’ laws to take into account TRC 
judgments might be needed.  But the relatively limited current use of these laws makes 
taking immediate action unnecessary.83 
80 For example, Amsterdam in the Netherlands ranked 26th most expensive city to live in, whereas 
Johannesburg South Africa ranked 126th. MERCER HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING, 2004 COST OF 
LIVING SURVEY (2005), available at http://www.finfacts.ie/costofliving3.htm.  
81 Ideally, the costs of the entire enterprise would gradually rise, as increased numbers of national TRCs 
made separate demands for resources.  But this would only happen if the ITRC was effective in its mission, 
in which case funding TRCs would presumably be seen as a cost-effective and appropriate investment for 
international aid budgets. 
82 See, e.g., Weissbrodt, supra note _ at 818-22;  Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its 
Global Reach, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003 at A1. 
83See, e.g., Comment, The Torture Victims Protection Act:  More Symbol than Substance, 43 EMORY L. J. 
1467 (1994). 
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A final issue is whether the ITRCs proposed activities are duplicative of current 
efforts by other organizations.  International criminal courts or individual TRCs are 
complementary to the ITRCs mission.  But NGOs like the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) are arguably already fulfilling part of the role this essay 
assigns to the ITRC.  The ICTJ, for example, already provides some on the ground 
support to existing TRCs and those thinking of starting them.84 These NGOs, and others 
like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Conflict Group (ICG), also 
monitor the activities of TRCs and identify best practices.85 The ICTJ even assists with 
certain post-TRC activities.86 
It is certainly true that the ITRC would duplicate some of the activities that these 
organizations currently sponsor.  But the global reach and solidity of the ITRC, as well as 
the credibility it would possess as an international organization rather than an unregulated 
NGO, would make it more effective.  The participation of national governments in its 
foundation and funding might also make it more effective in mobilizing resources and 
serving as a universally accepted center of support.  Unlike individual NGOs, the ITRC 
would also be accountable to its government members, providing additional credibility 
and making it harder to reject its advice.  This credibility and international support would 
also help in centralizing important functions like TRC archives.  Ideally, the ITRC would 
work with the NGOs, perhaps providing short-term contracts or creating other types of 
partnerships.  In addition, NGOs could also monitor the work of the ITRC—identifying 
ways in which it could improve its operations.  In short, the existence of the ICTJ and 
other organizations carrying out some of the functions of the ITRC is not an argument 
 
84 See, e.g., ICTJ ANNUAL REPORT, supra note _. 
85 See, e.g, A FRESH START?, supra note _; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE JURY IS STILL OUT 4 (2002).  
86 Telephone Interview with International Center for Transitional Justice Official (April 30, 2005). 
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against its creation.  These organizations actually provide evidence of the need for the 
ITRC’s services and could serve as a source of ideas and support for the new 
organization. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Any effort to set up an ITRC will inevitably face challenges not fully anticipated in 
this essay.  The problems addressed by transitional justice institutions—national traumas 
like apartheid and civil war—are sufficiently complex as to defy simple solutions.  Like 
nationally constituted TRCs or international criminal courts, the ITRC will be engaging 
in a balancing act.  National engagement, international “neutrality” and the competing 
demands of different stakeholders in any transitional justice process can probably never 
be balanced to universal satisfaction.  But the ITRC’s national/international structure 
should make it more effective at striking appropriate balances than the more limited 
transitional justice institutions that currently exist. 
The most serious challenge facing the ITRC will be achieving an appropriate balance 
between national concerns and international standards.  Theoretically, appropriate 
discussions and consensus building activities before area/national TRCs are created will 
help establish the bounds of a TRC’s operations, parameters that will help address 
specific operational questions.  In practice, the ITRC will probably have mixed success in 
efforts to appropriately incorporate local ideas and preferences, especially at first.  But 
the organization will gradually become better at conducting and incorporating local views 
into individual national TRCs.  As the TRCs that do this would seem to have the best 
chance of succeeding, the ITRC should eventually be able to identify the techniques and 
employees best suited to eliciting and incorporating local views. 
This essay has been relatively vague about the exact nature of the “flexible” activities 
individual TRCs will engage in.  Presumably, they will be along the general lines of other 
successful TRCs, with functions including truth telling, possible amnesties and 
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compensation.  But the ITRC’s role as a center for research and academic debate may 
also help develop additional techniques and perspectives.  In all cases, the specifics of 
local TRCs’ operations should be tailored to individual national contexts. 
In the long run, the exact impact of a successful ITRC on ICTs in general and the ICC 
in particular is unclear.  It could be that the ITRC and the ICC work out a mutually 
reinforcing arrangement, with each supporting the others’ activities.  It is also possible 
that the ITRC and the ICC could maintain an uneasy co-existence, without providing 
much mutual support.  Most explosively, the ITRC could displace the ICC entirely.  On a 
fundamental level, TRCs can theoretically address many transitional justice challenges 
more flexibly and effectively than a courtroom model.  Helping local TRCs reach their 
full theoretical potential could also lead to a re-examination of purely domestic legal 
approaches to national traumas. 
If the ITRC does succeed in tailoring to local views while preserving international 
standards, its success may lead to a global re-evaluation of the courtroom justice model 
even in western domestic settings.  The criticisms applied to international criminal 
tribunals—especially regarding the artificiality of legal formalism—are also applicable to 
the internal court systems of many western industrialized countries.  It would be both 
ironic and welcome if an international organization set up to assist those regions most 
affected by mass violence and other traumas helps spark a legal revolution in those 
countries that perceive themselves as most stable. 
 
